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Muez Karaja Democracy is culture not structures The comprehensive democratic transformation in the Arab world constitutes a major prerequisite for its waking from the deep slumber it has been falling into since a long time, for democracy is a window that allows clean air to enter the body of any society, and a mover that is capable of releasing capabilities, stimulating creativity and asserting the individual and collective selves. But this transformation is still an absent necessity in most Arab countries, as a result of a number of similar internal constraints, including the Palestinian society, even when it alone is subjugated by the yoke of the occupation, which constitutes a special impediment to its democratic transformation, but the internal constraints remain the most difficult and most challenging, as they are integral parts of the same body. Ahead of procedural and practical delving in the state of democracy in our Palestinian society, in terms of which spcietal and political groups lay its foundation; which groups distort this foundation intentionally or unintentionally; and before outlining the map of the current Palestinian democratic presence and the constraints of its rootedness and circulation, we must introduce the concept of democracy, which can constitute a basis for the desired social and political development, especially as the limits of this concept have become diluted in recent years, and became mixed with illusory elements and components, and is very remote from the true meaning of democracy, for it is not surprising to find most streams and categories of Arab society, whether political, social and civil and of different intellectual backgrounds, calling for democracy, yet each group has its own concept of democracy. The concept of democracy is a modernist concept that means: the freedom of individuals and groups that make up society by selecting the legal and legislative frameworks governing their lives and internal relations, and, therefore, it is a secular and non-religious concept, which stems from the person to manage his life and his relationship with fellow human-beings and with the State which he is connected to through a social civil non-patrimonial contract. Yet this modernist worldly concept of democracy significantly overlaps today in Arab society with historical and religious frameworks, whose theorists seek to create a special democratic space out of the framework of religious texts. Some might wonder; what prevents the blending of these concepts with each other? However, that mixing means that democracy is merely a political concept, while it is - and here we are talking of a new element - a comprehensive concept that is as comprehensive as the different areas of societal life itself, from the political to the economic; from education to learning, and from culture to literature, etc. Since one cannot in any way be active in a democratic political party without being a democratic father in dealing with members of one's family, nor can one be a democratic leader without establishing democratic educational system and curricula that are capable of educating qualified individuals to build a modern society, one cannot demand the right for candidacy and election as a man without respecting that right for women, and if you experience this schizophrenia, then you "selective" and not "democratic". Additionally, the concept of democracy is based on civic civil association, and not on a "blood" association, because the former has vast horizons and its borders are barely perceptible, and are not patrimonial, while the latter is narrow, biased and patrimonial. Since we do not separate between these two associations in our Palestinian society, our political parties have transformed into "clan parties," and our institutions have become "family" institutions. The President has become a father and the people a family. This hierarchical and superior relationship between the father and children in the Palestinian and Arab family in general expanded to include the relationship between the political system and the people. It is a relationship that was described by the late Dr. "Hisham Sharabi" in many of his writings as "a neo-Patriarchal relationship." He determined that the institutions of the Arab political system are based in its internal relations on developing that familial relationship, which also conforms to what Max Weber calls "individuality"; meaning that modern societies deal with the "individual" at the level of his achievements, and not as we do, based on his family origins, or the like. If we look at the previously mentioned issue from another angle, we would reach two general conclusions which are, first: The reinforcement of democracy in the Palestinian Arab society clashes with a "structural" conceptual crisis that is rooted in the mentality and culture, before resulting from political problems or external factors. This structural crisis is not the result of deficiencies in knowledge, as much as it is the product of a cultural societal insistence to consider modernist concepts through the eyes of history and the past, which leads us to break up, select, adapt, and fabricate things and therefore we empty it from its real content and fail to bring about the change required from it. Here we must differentiate between adapting the modern to the old and " -constructing the modern on top of the old", where the first case means that you retain your old, i.e., your history and social heritage, the way it is without considering, criticizing and assessing it, and "return" to it with the products of modernity to try to adapt it to your old. Therefore, the old remains old and the modern loses its role, as it is a "fabricated" rather than "interactive" relationship. While "constructing the modern on top of the old" means: that society is venturing into a long and arduous process of criticism, study and assessment of its past and history, in order to eventually construct a sound and suitable foundation for construction. Subsequently, your old becomes capable of assimilating all the products of modernity without having it lose its content, thus becoming capable of launching towards the desired future. This often leads me to wonder about the secret of that closed-circuit, within which we, as an Arab society, revolve. Since the times of "Al-Afghani" and "Abdo" and those who preceded them, and since the times of Qasem Amin and those who followed him, and since Napoleon's canons raided the "Impregnable East" with the products of modernity, the major questions keep repeating themselves in controversy, without reaching a satisfactory answer for any of them. The form and method of controversy might have changed, yet the content is the same, and unfortunately this controversy will not be resolved as long as the relationship between our past and present is not determined, and consequently identifying how to assimilate the products of modernity, which has democracy as one of its most important foundations. The second conclusion, on the other hand, which we could draw from the recent past, is related to the mechanisms of action of effecting a democratic transition: since our admission of the existence of a systemic structural crisis that prevents democracy from taking its natural place in the folds of our society and penetrating into its depths means that we need a serious scientific re-examination of our cultural and social components before talking about our political expressions, i.e., we must revise the determinants of our behavior as a society before putting the results or expressions of such behavior on trial. In other words, this implies the necessity of effecting change in the societal individual and collective awareness. However, the focus of the Palestinian political system, which had been represented for the first time in the Palestinian National Authority, and the Arab political system in general, continues to be placed on the development of parliaments, holding elections, the formation of political parties, and other such manifestations. This entails that we seek to build a position for democracy in our "political echelons," without laying its foundations in our "cultural roots." Because this is the case, most of these political systems managed to construct "democratic structures", but failed to establish a "democratic culture," and managed to effect change in forms but not content, although changing content leads to changing forms, and not vice versa. Our adoption of this comprehensive modernist, worldly concept of democracy implies that the primary obstacle to a democratic transition in the Palestinian society is those "cultural idols" that are entrenched in it, and the hereditary patriarchal relationship that governs it, which is staunchly blocking the assimilation of this modernist product. Another obstacle is also closely tied to and reinforces the former obstacle. It is manifested in the Palestinian educational system, where Palestinian children shift from loyalty to the supreme head of the household, and the inspiring father who is never mistaken, and who must be obeyed without discussion or criticism, to the authority of the "teacher," who completes the role of the father, since he is also a supreme ruler, and a sacred source of information, in spite of all the media and information openness provided by modern means of communication. Additionally, the educational method still depends primarily on indoctrination and memorization of information, more than understanding and analysis, and is based on reward and punishment, rather than on internal motivation of the student, and the establishment of a knowledge loving personality that searches for and is critical of knowledge. These Palestinian educational system elements eventually end up creating a suppressed and passive personality that is full of "idols" and that prefers "implementation" over its capability to "innovate", and sanctifies "loyalty" more than love for "belonging" and, therefore, the way it expresses itself is not usually a sound democratic expression, and its behavior is almost constrained between dependency and rebellion. The latest Human Development Report issued by the United Nations indicated that there are about 70 million illiterate people in the Arab world, while in 2005, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics mentioned that in Palestine, the rate of those who do not know how to read and write (from the age of 15 years and above) was 3.5% among males and 12% among females. These figures compel us to raise a question about the chances of the evolution of a modern and democratic Palestinian Arab society, when it contains millions of illiterate people, especially that it is known that the lower the level of education of the individual the more common the individual's tendency to lead a traditional life, to believe in superstition, and to dislike the other and the products of modernity. Additionally, it is easier to control, form, and cause the individual to accept his reality together with its ills, than his ability to criticize or reject this reality and trying to change it. A 3.5% illiteracy rate among Palestinian males might not be high, compared with those figures in many Arab states, given the un-natural circumstances experienced by the Palestinian society under occupation. However, the quality of education and its curricula in general have today produced "staff" more than producing persons who have sufficient qualifications for innovation of knowledge. The significant difference between the illiteracy rate of males and that of females is a reflection of the discrimination exercised by the patriarchal system, and which is reinforced by the educational system. This subordination of women and their being absented from the public life of society is another obstacle to the establishment of a society with democratic content. If we are to move on from these social and educational constraints to constraints of a political nature, we find that the Palestinian political parties constitute one of those. This partisan constraint derives its importance from the fact that the conditions of the Palestinian society make it a political society by nature. That is why the party is considered a pivotal and central institution in the life of the Palestinian citizen. It also has a presumed and important leading role in the democratization process, which is manifested in educating its members on the democratic culture, its ability to circulate it in society, and in creating the models that may constitute a positive and encouraging indicator for society to move in the democratization process. Most important is the ability of the political party to mobilize social forces that can achieve and protect this transformation. But this presumed role is still absent from the Palestinian parties. In fact, they practice the opposite in many of their political and social behaviors. Since, despite the internal regulations governing the work of such parties, which may include democratic indicators and mechanisms of action, the actual practice does not reflect that. Although regulations dictate the periodic election of the secretary generals, that did not happen historically except in rare instances and as a result of "compelling, beyond the will" circumstances. Also, the Palestinian political party has failed in forming an alternative, civil and voluntary bond to the compulsory clan bond, as the large national halo that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s, which caused us to feel that the diminishing of the blood bond was for the benefit of civil, national and political bonds, was just a crust that had retreated at once in favor of traditional education, as signs of "political stability" accompanied the formation of the Palestinian National Authority, where the Palestinian society became familiar with a unique phenomenon known as "clan parties", meaning that each party has a special agency to attract certain families, not on the basis of ideological infiltrating, or on the basis of adopting their political platforms, but on the basis of the exchange of traditional interests and "pro kin" stances. The Palestinian political parties also failed in infiltrating society with progressive social programs, and in mobilizing social forces in support of these programs. It seemed that the bulk of their focus was on political programs. However, even political affiliation with these parties has dropped considerably in recent years, as shown by an opinion poll which indicated that about 35% of Palestinian youth do not see themselves represented by any of these parties. if the Palestinian educational system and curricula reinforce "social idols" that run contrary to democratic life, and if political parties do not constitute a presumed alternative to that hereditary system, there is another factor, represented by the Palestinian media, which appeases and reinforces the above-mentioned elements according to its adopted policies, instead of contributing to the establishment of a democratic culture. It practiced self-censorship that almost exceeds that practiced by the political or social authority. This self-censorship is stricter with regard to criticizing the maxims, customs and traditional concepts of Palestinian society, since Palestinian media is not ready to bear the consequences of carrying out its enlightening role. Hence it prefers to transmit what the society accepts to hear, and not what it must hear, and it describes societal reality but does not dare to criticize it. I have prepared a study entitled "The image of women in Palestinian newspapers," which was issued by the Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development (PANORAMA) in 2003, in which I concluded that the absence of serious discussion and profound raising of topics concerning women's reality in its various components were apparent. Additionally, the nature of what is presented in the newspapers does not exceed the traditional conception of Palestinian women, since when this study shifted to comparing the image of women derived from the newspapers to her image that is entrenched in the mentality of the Palestinian society; they proved to be similar in many respects. This entails that the Palestinian media also plays a role that is contrary to its presumed role, i.e., raising societal awareness and contributing to effecting a democratic transformation. These impediments to the democratic transformation, and particularly those related to our social and educational systems, were supposed to be demolished by the pick of the official Palestinian political system represented by the PNA, since this system constituted a historic opportunity for the Palestinian society to build itself on modern and democratic foundations, drawing from all the surrounding Arab failures. Yet it failed to do so, and instead of spreading a culture of law and reinforcing its sovereignty in the Palestinian society, it reduced the importance of this culture, and emphasized the pre-existing traditional structures. For example, it has set up what is known as the "Clan Affairs Council" based on a decision of the late President Yasser Arafat, at a time when the judicial system in the West Bank had only 32 judges assigned to courts in all levels. Although the legislative institution had started to propose and pass new laws that would organize the life of our society, progress has been very slow in terms of qualitative laws that would manage delicate social topics, and that would establish for a genuine democratic culture that permeates our established cultural contexts, since both the punitive and family laws are still vacillating between the second and third readings without being approved. What was recently achieved in the Palestinian election law, by approving a "quota for women" in local councils, is a new development in terms of building structures without any change to content, because this decision was not linked to a conscious policy by the political system, and which was not followed by implementation mechanisms that make it a tool of change in the societal mentality towards women. Additionally, our political system has not been able to build a national economic system that is able of transitioning the Palestinian society to the expanses of democracy, given that the policies of the national economy and the level of its development would either be conducive to the democratic transformation or be an impediment to it. The existence of a free national economy that is capable of the accumulation and fair distribution of national capital constitutes a necessary environment for the invigoration of democracy. This implies the ability of the political system in society to formulate and design its different policies, according to its internal needs and requirements, without external pressures, and also entails the existence of citizens who are free from the "worries of living" complex. However, the recent political developments proved that the Palestinian Authority was standing on two paper feet, as improvement in living conditions that prevailed to some extent in the first years of the PNA life turned upside down with the beginning of the current Intifada, which shows that we are still living in an almost complete subordination to the Israeli economy, and that in mere moments Israel is capable of shutting down commercial crossings and borders, withholding tax revenues, and even destroying our modest infrastructure, and consequently, more than half of the Palestinian society is now living under the poverty threshold. With the results of the last legislative elections, which brought the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) to power, the international community imposed an economic blockade on the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian society, which has led us to a catastrophic economic situation. Because this is the case, the first days following the election results demonstrated a peaceful hand-over of power, which is rare in most Arab countries, but that quickly changed to street in-fighting, for all the apparent democratic indicators such as fair and honest elections and the presence of a political system, are structures without content, and our political decision is no longer ours and, therefore, in-fighting instead of dialogue was a natural result. Additionally, the Palestinian Authority, even when it is governed by the "Paris Economic Agreement", which reinforces our economic dependence, has also followed an erroneous economic policy that brought us to where we are now. It did not make the necessary effort to set up a developmental base, but rather most of its work revolved around the "relief" framework. Instead of establishing local production projects, it created a huge army of government officials who depend with their wages on external aid, and today have become blackmail cards in the hands of many parties. This is apart from the many corrupt practices in this area, and that created what is known as the "cronies", i.e., those who rally around the political system to benefit from it, which is contrary to the democratic relationship between public servants and their political system. There is no doubt that a significant development resulted with the establishment of the National Authority, as we have mentioned. For the first time ever, the Palestinian society has a political system with known institutions and roles. It also effected a qualitative shift in the nature of controversy and internal Palestinian debate, which was limited in the past to national concerns, and caused social and cultural topics to emerge for the first time in this sphere of debate. Starting with the proceeding discussion, the strengthening of a genuine democratic culture requires the demolition of a biased traditional culture, and getting through to an individual who is capable to integrate into this culture. It also requires liberating the citizen from the educational system of indoctrination. To reach these two demanding pre-requisites for the Palestinian democratic transformation, we need what can be called a corrective movement within the Palestinian parties, in order for them to be able to return the official Palestinian political system to the democratic course that needs to be followed. There is no doubt that the disappearance of abnormal political conditions which Palestinians live under, particularly the occupation would make this transformation easier. Yet this entire process requires other elements and social categories, which are historically considered the cause in changing the lives of societies and their democratic transformation. These categories include: Civil society: A traditional controversy exists about whether civil society is the result of the presence of an established democracy in society, or whether it is the one that contributes to the establishment of said democracy. While we recognize the dialectical relationship between the two, the Palestinian civil society has a special role in this area, since it has an old history and a long experience that preceded the official political system by years, and since it constituted an important societal and political frame of reference for the Palestinians, especially during the eighties of the last century, whether as trade unions, student councils or private institutions, or even political parties as part of it. At some point after the formation of the political system, it entered a new stage, which required it to shift a significant part of its political interest to internal developmental and cultural issues, where it constantly works to raise societal awareness and to disseminate democratic concepts, but, despite the importance of these activities in effecting a Palestinian democratic transformation, these contributions are still below the required level, since it has so far not been able to create the broad popular base, and has not presented itself as a real civil alternative for patrimonial loyalty. The organic intellectual: according to Gramsci's concept, it is the intellectual who sees the necessity of the existence of social forces that protect his idea, and who would be sincerely reflecting the concerns, hopes and aspirations of the citizens, therefore, he is capable of spreading the light of knowledge in society, and mobilizing the social forces around him so they can complete the transformation. However, the Palestinian Arab society still lacks this intellectual, to the benefit of the "authority intellectual," while there is still a third type of intellectuals; that who lives in alienation and isolation from his society. He has the knowledge and intellect that express for society, but he is unable to adhere to the various social forces and to mobilize them around him. Middle categories: These categories have had a historical role in changing the lives of societies, such as the middle bourgeoisie, university students and technocrats, etc. Those adhere to the social concerns of their societies, and have objective knowledge and enlightened intellect. They are simultaneously not subject to the concerns of living that the poor are subject to, and are not connected to the interests of the major economic groups. The youth: Palestinian youths have constituted a major implement in resisting the occupation, but they did not receive adequate attention from their society. Besides, the official Palestinian political system and Palestinian parties dealt with them as implementation tools. Perhaps I should mention here the heated debate in the corridors of the Legislative Council during the discussion of the electoral law, about reducing the candidacy age. However, this proposal was met with strong opposition for flimsy reasons that only reflect the insistence of "parents" on the possession of the lives of "sons," although the primary party responsible for the development of the youth sector in any society is the political system, in addition to the civil society, on the grounds that the investment in this sector is an investment in society in general, and that uplifting it is a guarantee for the participation of an important category in the advancement of society and contributing to its democratic transformation, while neglecting this youth sector, which constitutes a majority of most Arab societies, and leaving them to suffer from ignorance and poverty means the construction of a impenetrable human dam that would face this modernist transformation. Unfortunately, this lack of investment is the prevalent tendency in Palestine and the Arab world in general. A distressing proportion of the Arab youth is tending towards intolerance, isolation, superstition and rejection of the other, or towards indifference, degradation of values and belonging, and deep alienation from societal reality. Based on the above, my faith, as a Palestinian Arab youth, in the possibility of achieving a "democracy of content", and my faith in the ability of democracy, if achieved, to raise our society out of its various aspects of backwardness, prompts me to continuously act through the means and sites available to contribute to the achievement of this goal. |